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It is submitted that the Maryland court reached the correct de-
cision in the Shoemaker case since it is very likely that the jury's ver-
dict was influenced to the prejudice of the defendant because of the
state attorney's inference that its responsibility could be shifted to
another body.
In considering a proper approach at the trial level, it is important
to bear in mind that guilt and punishment are two distinct issues and
the subject of pardon should have absolutely' no bearing on the de-
termination of guilt. It is therefore suggested that where there is no
procedural separation for the determination of the two issues, the
prosecuting attorney should not be allowed to make any reference to
the matter since the natural effect of such a reference coming from the
prosecution would lead the jury to conclude that the subject is a proper
consideration in determining guilt or that some of its responsibility
may be shifted to another body and that any mistake which it may
make will later be cured by the executive branch.
ROBERT G. BANNON
ADMITTING LIE-DETECTOR RESULTS BY STIPULATION
Lie-detector tests have yet to achieve judicial acceptance, their
results being generally held inadmissible in evidence.' Objection to
admissibility is generally placed on the ground that the test has not
yet achieved scientific reliability.2 There is no simple answer to the
problem of determining reliability of such tests. 3 Authorities in the
fields of psychology and physiology, who are best acquainted with the
theory and nature of the deception apparatus and technique, are in
disagreement.4 Until there is some degree of unanimity within the
scientific world as to the reliability of the machine, the courts will not
'See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 999 (3 d ed. 1940, Supp. 1962); 2 Wharton Criminal
Evidence § 666 (12 ed. 1957); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 13o6 (1952, Supp. 1962).
2Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1o 3 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Becker, 3oo
Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d
495 (s95i); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). See cases collected
in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 13o6, 1308 (1952, Supp. 1962).
3See Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, 11o (3d ed. 1953)
where an attempt is made to determine the accuracy of lie-detector tests given under
ideal conditions.
'The results of a survey suggest that the psychology profession does not have
an answer to the question of "general scientific recognition." Cureton, A Consensus
as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1953); Inbau &
Reid, supra note 3 at 13o.
174 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
accord full judicial recognition to the present lie-detector tests.5
The recent Arizona case of State v. Valdez6 recognizes that an ex-
ception exists to this well established rule where parties have stipu-
lated that the results of the test should be admissible in evidence. In
Valdez the defendant was charged with possessing narcotics. Prior to
trial, the parties signed a stipulation, agreeing that the defendant
would take a lie-detector test and that the results would be admissible
by either party. However, as the results were unfavorable to the de-
fendant, he objected to the introduction of the examiner's testimony
at the trial. The trial court allowed the disputed evidence to go to
the jury, which found the defendant guilty, but certified the question
of admissibility to the Supreme Court of Arizona.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in a case of first impression, held
that polygraphs and expert testimony relating thereto are admissible
upon stipulation entered into by both parties.7 The court stated
that at the present time such evidence would be inadmissible in the
absence of the stipulation. The few prior reported cases involving stipu-
lations are not entirely consistent in their holdings.8 Drawing upon
the equivocation of the cases and the recognition that polygraphic
interrogation has been considerably improved since 1923 when the
leading case of Frye v. United States9 was decided, the Arizona court
recognized an exception to the general rule and thereby provided for
admissibility in Valdez.
As the general rule against admissibility is founded on the absence
53 Wigmore, Evidence § 990 (3d ed. 194o); Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation 122 (3d ed. 1953). The lie-detector tests in current use are
systolic blood pressure test, and the tests conducted with the pathometer or the
polygraph. These devices measure either blood pressure, respiration and pulse rate,
or electrical impulses. Frequently a combination of two or more of them is used;
and the devices operate on the premise that conscious telling of a lie produces a
change in the normal readings.
691 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
7371 P.2d at goo.
8People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (prop-
erly admitted); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 1o4 N.W.2d 568 (1966) (properly
admitted); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 6o6 50 N.W. 2d 172 (1951) (non-prejudicial
error to have admitted); State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961)
(reversible error to admit); LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943)
(properly excluded). See State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Col-
bert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957); State v. Armwine, 67 N.J.
Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (App. Div. 1962) implying that a stipulation would have
cured the objectionable offer.
9293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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of scientific reliability and recognition of the results,' 0 it is worthy
of note that the question of reliability was not resolved in Valdez. The
court acknowledged that the techniques of lie detection have been
improved, quoted the most recent statistics as to the accuracy of the
tests, and then concluded that much remains to be done before the
results can be admitted generally." The sole ground for its decision
was the stipulation by the parties.'
2
Before the decision in Valdez, the question whether a stipulation
would be sufficient to distinguish the case from the long line of
precedents against admissibility had never been expressly resolved
with the deliberation that the Arizona court gave the question.' 3 Legal
writers have long maintained that the rule against general admissibility
would not bar admissibility of the results if the test was given upon
stipulation.'4 E. F. Inbau, a noted authority on lie-detectors, re-
ports that as early as 1935 a Wisconsin trial court admitted lie-detector
testimony as evidence upon stipulation.' 5 There are records of other
similar unreported cases. 16 However, appellate courts have almost in-
"°See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952, Supp. 1962); Hardman, Lie Detectors.
Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. Va. L. Rev. 37 (1941).
2371 P.2d at 898.
121d. at goo.
2Held properly admitted upon stipulation, People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App.
2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104
N.W.2d 568 (196o). Contra, State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
Held results not having stature of competent evidence, Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich.
606, 5o N.V.2d 172 (1951). Held properly excluded, LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis.
16, 8 N.V.2d 288 (1943). Offer of polygraph tests refused, People v. Wochnick, 98
Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 7o (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. App. 181,
188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); Beoche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.V.2d 593 (1949); State
v. Puscb, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim.
45. 230 P.2d 495 (1951); Peterson v. State, 247 S.V.2d lo (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
1 Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation, 132-135 (3 d ed. 1953);
Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev.
711, 726 (1953); Streeter & Belli, The "Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, 5 Vand.
L. Rev. 549, 558 (1952)-
"The record of blood-pressure variations of an accused person, made during
an interrogation while voluntarily submitting to the application of suitable appa-
ratus (polygraph, electrocardiograph, "lie-detector") is admissible, either to corro-
borate or discredit his testimony." Wigmore, Code of Evidence § 975 (3d ed. 1942).
'-State v. Loniello (1935) reported in Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique
Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 262 (1935).
"'State v. Rowe (1936); State v. Conn (1941) noted in 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 430,
435-
"Although the lie-detector is yet to be sanctioned by an appellate court, trial
judges the country over, convinced of its merits, have admitted the results of
lie-detector tests in evidence in unappealed and therefore unreported cases." An
extensive list is appended. 29 Cornell L.Q. 535, 540 ('944).
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variably' held that the offered testimony was properly excluded or
that the admission of the testimony of the examiner was reversible
error, notwithstanding that the test was given and the results offered
upon stipulation.17 There runs throughout the opinions of the
courts the idea that the general rule applies in all cases. Only two
jurisdictions have held otherwise. California in People v. Houser 8
and Iowa in State v. McNarnara'9 have held the evidence admissible
upon facts similar to Valdez, but no attempt in either decision was
made to establish an exception to the general rule against admis-
sibility. In both these cases the tests were given following a stipu-
lation; and both resulted in testimony unfavorable to the defendants,
who objected to admission. The courts of both states affirmed the
conviction of the defendants, passing on the question of admissibility
with the statement that the defendants could not be heard to complain
merely because the results were unfavorable to them. 2
0
The holding in Valdez places great emphasis on the stipulation.2 '
If the general rule against admissibility is recognized and accepted, as
it was by the Arizona Supreme Court,22 the stipulation must in some
manner be regarded as a satisfactory substitute for a lack of recognized
scientific reliability. It can only be tentatively said that the stipulation
offers some guarantee of reliability that lie-detector tests given with-
out a stipulation might not possess. The usual stipulation is an agree-
ment not only as to the admissibility of the results but also as to the
subject matter, time, place, and operator of the tests. 23 It is thus ap-
parent that in this respect the stipulation offers certain safeguards
against abuse in the use of the lie-detector that might otherwise arise
in obtaining evidentiary results. Moreover, a stipulation can, in
other instances, waive statutory and constitutional rights, in addition
to providing for the admission of facts proved by evidence otherwise
inadmissible.24 Consequently, what the stipulation achieved in Valdez
"See note 13 supra.
'885 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
"252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (196o).
2°People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937, 942 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948);
State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568, 573 (196o).
2On the theory, nature, and evidentiary affects of stipulations in general see
9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2588-2597 (3d ed. 1940). The practice is formally termed
judicial admission. Wigmore calls it a substitute for. evidence, for it does away
with the need for evidence.
22371 P.2d at 898.
OInbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 135 (3d ed. 1953)
gives a sample of the usual stipulation.
2'9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2592 (3d ed. 194o, Supp. 1962).
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by way of substitution is in keeping with the sound practice of judicial
admission by stipulation.25
The court in Valdez has said that much remains to be done to
perfect the lie-detector apparatus so as to make it fully acceptable.
26
Of course, this does not mean that the machine and technique have
no value whatever. The court recognizes the present value of the lie-
detector to the extent that if the parties are willing to stipulate the
admissibility of the results, they must be relying on the effectiveness
of the machine and of its operator, and consequently the court will
not pass on their good judgment. Furthermore, the parties ought not
to be heard first to claim that the' tests are effective, and subsequently
when the results are unfavorable, to assert that the results have no
value.
Because of the nature of the case, Valdez stands for two proposi-
tions:the place of a lie-detector test in a criminal proceeding, and the
value of a stipulation. First, because the scientific reliability of lie-
detector tests is still tenuous, unrestricted recognition of the results
cannot be granted at present. However, where the parties desire to
use this means, they should be permitted to do so. This appears to
be an equitable and intelligent position for the courts to take in
regard to a scientific device that has constantly been used and im-
proved since the turn of the century.27 Secondly, the use of a stipula-
tion has been held in high regard in other cases where it has been em-
ployed.28 Admitting evidence of lie-detector tests taken upon stipu-
lation guarantees the basic element of fair play between parties found
in this evidentiary practice.
G. L. Ou.-LLETr
27Id. at § 2588.
237 1 P.2d at 898.
'See Inbau & Reid, note 23 supra, at 2-8 for the history of the lie-detector,
especially the improvements thereon since the original.
3"Any other result would seem to be inconsistent with the general spirit and
practice of our litigation, which judicially leaves to the parties the framing of
their pleadings and issues and determines no objection not expressly raised by one
of them. Moreover . . . the judicial refusal to recognize it [the stipulation] would
often permit unseemly breaches of faith by counsel who have agreed to the ad-
mission." 9 Wigmore, note 24 supra, at § 2592.
